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Abstract: Cost effective policies allow minimising the compliance costs associated to
reaching a desired environmental quality target. In this paper a conceptual model has
been developed to examine the compliance costs under an intra-plant emission trading
system for a non-uniformly mixed assimilative pollutant. The model incorporates the
number of emission sources, the concentration of pollutants emitted at each source, the
marginal cost of abatement for each source, the transfer coefficient that relates emission
at each source with the impact on ambient air quality, and the desired ambient air
quality target. The model is applied to an integrated steel plant in India.  Results of this
study demonstrate that the emission trading is more cost effective than the existing
regulatory system.  Further, intra-plant trades would result in significant savings to the
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There is a growing consensus amongst economists and policy makers that for
the environmental policy to be effective there is a need to supplement the traditional
command and control type of regulation with economic instruments. The main reasons
for this move lie in the existing evidence on the growing levels of environmental
degradation suggesting that the command and control type of regulation has not proved
to be very effective in inducing the polluters to adopt pollution prevention and control
and that the economic instruments are generally more cost-effective. Intuitively, cost
effectiveness results from lower total abatement costs through a shift of the burden of
abatement from high to low cost abaters.
Tradable permits for pollution control is one such economic instrument.
Tradable permit systems can be of two types.  The first type is inter-plant trading which
allows emission trading among existing plants in a specified geographical area.  The
second type is that of intra-plant trading which allows different discharge points of a
large firm to trade emissions among themselves. The latter offers the firm the option of
reducing pollution loads beyond discharge limits at one or more discharge points and
crediting it to other discharge points so that the pre-determined level of environmental
standards or pollution reduction is met at a lower cost. This study attempts to design an
intra-firm  emission trading scheme for suspended particulate matter (SPM) in an
integrated steel plant in India.  Specifically we examine the costs of meeting the target
emission standard for SPM for stationery sources of SPM in a steel plant, under the
current regulatory system and the system of emissions trading among the emission
sources under the common ownership, using the bubble concept.iii
A conceptual model has been developed to examine the compliance costs under
an intra-plant emission trading system for a non-uniformly mixed assimilative
pollutant. The model incorporates the number of emission sources, the concentration of
pollutants emitted at each source, the marginal cost of abatement for each source, the
transfer coefficient that relates emission at each source with the impact on ambient air
quality, and the desired ambient air quality target. The model is applied to an integrated
steel plant in India.  Results of this study demonstrate that the emission trading is more
cost effective than the existing regulatory system.  Further, intra-plant trades would
result in 4.7 per cent saving to the plant while securing an improvement in ambient air
quality in the studied geographical area. These point towards the need to implement
intra-plant trading in identified integrated steel plant in India.iv
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TRADABLE PERMITS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:
CASE STUDY OF AN INTEGRATED STEEL PLANT IN INDIA
1. Introduction
There is a growing consensus amongst economists and policymakers that for the
environmental policy to be effective there is a need to supplement the traditional
command and control type of regulation with economic instruments. The main reasons
for this move lie in the existing evidence on the growing levels of environmental
degradation suggesting that the command and control type of regulation has not proved
to be very effective in inducing the polluters to adopt pollution prevention and control
and that the economic instruments are generally more cost-effective.
1 Intuitively, cost
effectiveness results from lower total abatement costs through a shift of the burden of
abatement from high to low cost abaters.
Tradable permits for pollution control is one such economic instrument.
Tradable permit systems can be classified into two groups.  The first type is inter-plant
trading which allows emission trading among existing plants in a specified
geographical area; the second is that of intra-plant trading, which allows different
discharge points of a large firm to trade emissions among themselves. The latter offers
the firm the option of reducing pollution loads beyond discharge limits at one or more
discharge points and crediting it to other discharge points so that the pre-determined
level of environmental standards or pollution reduction is met at a lower cost. This
study attempts to design an intra-firm emission trading scheme for an integrated steel
plant in India.  Trading scheme is designed for suspended particulate matter (SPM), a
toxic air pollutant emitted by the steel plants which can alter the immune system andvi
can cause serious health hazards.  The main purpose of this exercise is to assess the
potential savings associated with implementing economic, rather than current
regulatory approaches to abate SPM in a local airshed.  Specifically we examine the
costs of meeting the target emission standard for SPM for stationery sources of SPM in
a steel plant, under the current regulatory system and the system of emissions trading
among the emission sources under the common ownership, using the bubble concept.
2
The paper concludes by drawing out some of the policy implications of this analysis.
2. The Analytical Model
What constitutes an emission trading system depends on the attributes of
pollutants being controlled. To be consistent with the cost effectiveness objective of the
emission control policy, different trading schemes would be required for different types
of pollutants.  For instance, for pollutants that are uniformly mixed in the atmosphere,
trading between two emission sources can take place on a one-to-one basis, as a unit
emission of pollutant from any discharge point in an airshed would contribute to
ambient air quality in the same manner.  That is, in the case of uniformly mixed
pollutants, the ambient concentration of the pollutant depends on the total amount of
pollutant discharged, but not on the location of discharge points.  Thus a unit reduction
in emission from any source within an airshed would have the same effect on the
ambient air quality.  However, the instrument design is somewhat different when
pollutants are not uniformly mixed in the atmosphere such as the SPM, which as noted
earlier is also the focus of this study.  In the case of SPM, trading cannot be on one-to-
                                                                                                                                                                
1  See Bohm and Russell (1985), Baumol and Oates (1988), and Montgomery (1972).
2  The bubble concept allows various polluters in a geographical area – with varying abatement
costs – to jointly abate a predetermined quantity of pollutants.  See Atkinson and Tietenberg (1982).vii
one basis, as the location of the discharge points (including the stack height) matters –
all sources do not contribute to ambient air quality in the same manner.  Their
contribution depends on each source's emission diffusion characteristics with respect to
each monitored receptor.   This implies that one unit of extra reduction (over and above
the legislated level) by source ‘a’ may not necessarily be equivalent to one unit of
excess emission (over the legislated level) by source ‘b’ if the emission diffusion
characteristics or transfer coefficients for sources ‘a’ and ‘b’, associated with a given
receptor are not the same.
The cost effective allocation of a non-uniformly mixed assimilative
3 pollutant is
that allocation which minimises the cost of pollution control subject to the constraint
that the target concentration level of pollutant in the ambient air is met at all receptors
in the airshed.   This can be represented as
4:
         J
Min S Cj (rj) (1)
      j=1
subject to
             J
  Ai  ‡  S dij (ej – rj) i = 1,…,I (2)
          j=1
 rj ‡ 0  j = 1,…..,J (3)
Here Cj is the cost of emission reduction and  rj is the amount of emission
reduction that the j
th source has to achieve, and J is the number of sources (discharge
points) to be regulated.  As rj increases, the marginal cost of control is expected to
increase.  ej is the emission rate of the 
jth source that would prevail if the source failed
                                                       
3  For assimilative pollutants, the capacity of the environment to absorb them is relatively large
compared to their rate of emission, such that the pollution level in any year is independent of the amount
discharged in the previous years.  In other words, assimilative pollutants do not accumulate over time.
4  See Tietenberg (1985).viii
to control any pollution at all.  Ai is the level of air quality obtained at receptor i when
the firms are in compliance with the current point source standards.  dij is the transfer
coefficient which measures the contribution of one unit of SPM emissions from source
j to concentrations of SPM in the ambient air measured at receptor i.  The transfer co-
efficient expresses the diffusion characteristics of the pollutants and is a function of
such factors as average wind velocity and direction, temperature, the locations of
sources and receptors, as well as source stack heights.  In the absence of trading, rj
would be equal to ej minus the prescribed (legislated) emission standard for source j.
A cost effective allocation must satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for
optimum allocation; the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the above problem are:
            I
  dCj(rj)/drj - S dijli ‡ 0  j = 1,….,J (4)
         
i=1
     I




  Ai  ‡  S dij (ej – rj) i = 1,…..I (6)
          
j=1
     J
  li[Ai  -  S dij (ej – rj)] = 0 i = 1,…..I (7)
  
j=1
  rj ‡ 0, li ‡ 0  j = 1,….,J (8)
i = 1,…..I
Equation (4) states that in a cost effective allocation for SPM or any other
pollutant falling in the class of non-uniformly mixed assimilative pollutants, each
source should equate its marginal cost of emission reduction with a weighted average
of the marginal cost of concentration reduction  (li) at each affected receptor.  Theix
weights are the transfer coefficients associated with each receptor.  That is, for SPM, it
is not the marginal costs of emission reduction that are equalised across sources in a
cost-effective allocation (as would be the case for uniformly mixed assimilative
pollutants), rather it is the marginal costs of concentration reduction at each monitored
receptor that are equalised.
3. Abatement Cost Functions
Constraints on data required for estimating economic cost functions led us to
use engineering cost functions for SPM abatement.  In deriving the cost of SPM
abatement, only the operating costs of pollution abatement are considered.  Capital
costs of abatement, devices are treated as sunk costs since the model is based on the
existing clean up operations at the steel plant.  Annual operating cost of SPM
abatement is taken to be a function of the volume of SPM laden gas and the
concentrations of SPM in the gas before and after the abatement  (Pandey, 1998).  This
can be written as:
operating cost = f (volumetric flow of gas, concentration of SPM in the gas before
subjected to treatment, concentration of SPM in the gas after the
treatment).
The abatement cost is expected to vary in the following manner.
AC = {Q (SPMbt – SPMat)}
￿ (9)
where,  AC = abatement cost (Rs.)
Q = volumetric flow of gas (Nm
3/day)
SPMbt = concentration of SPM before treatment (mg/Nm
3)
SPMat = concentration of SPM after treatment (mg/Nm
3)
￿ = different variable for every abatement facility.
the value of ￿ is a constant and is expected to lie between 1 and e (2.71).x
The abatement cost function defined by (9) provides means to compute the
marginal cost of SPM abatement over a range of SPM concentration for pollution
control devices currently in use at the steel plant.  The marginal cost is the change in
total cost at the margin arising from removing any additional unit of pollutant.  In brief,
the change in AC at the margin arising from a unit change in Q(SPMbt – SPMat) is




where, R = Q (SPMbt – SPMat)
4. Steel Plants: Sources of and Techniques for SPM Abatement
The production of steel in India is dominated by a number of large integrated
iron and steel plants in the public sector under the control of the Steel Authority of
India Limited (SAIL).  There are five main production stages in an integrated steel
plant: coke oven batteries; blast furnace; steel melting shop (SMS); casting of steel and
rolling mills.
An integrated steel plant generates environmental pollution at each stage of the
production process.  SPM is an important air pollutant released from steel plants in
India.  The main sources of SPM emissions in a steel plant are: coke ovens, sinter
plants, power plants, refractories, blast furnace, and SMS.  Steel plants in India have
mainly been using end of the pipe control equipment for controlling air pollution
(Kakkar, 1998).  Equipment for air pollution abatement includes various types of water
scrubbers, cyclones, bag filters and electronic precipitators (ESPs).  Minimal national
standards (MINAS) have been specified for various  pollutants which apply to eachxi
discharge point within the steel plant (table 1). The MINAS is defined as the maximum
concentration of pollutants allowed per unit of gas emitted.









Source:  CPCB (1988).
*  During oxygen lencing, otherwise norm is 150 mg/Nm
3.
** For power plants less than 200 MW, emission norm is 350 mg/Nm
3.
5. The Data
It may be noted here that though the analytical model presented in section 2 can
be used to design both inter-plant as well as intra-plant emission trading, in this paper,
however, the model is applied to examine intra-plant trading in an integrated steel
plant.  The Bokaro Steel Plant (BSP) is selected as a case study.  The data has been
obtained from the plant by means of a questionnaire, and several rounds of personal
discussions with the staff of the environment management division at the BSP as well
as the corporate office of SAIL at New Delhi.
Owing to the nature of SPM (non-uniformly mixed pollutant) an air quality
modelling technique is used to determine the ambient air quality that would be obtained
in the baseline emission scenario in the local airshed (20 x 20 km area around the steel
plant) and in the emissions trading scenario.  The baseline emission scenario refers to
the situation in which the prescribed (legislated) point source emission standards are
met at all the discharge points at the steel plant.  As noted earlier, the estimates of
transfer coefficients for each discharge point for the receptors affected by its emissionsxii
and the relative costs of abatement of SPM across emission sources would determine
the final trading outcome.  These have been obtained as follows.
The effect of emissions from various discharge points in the plant on the local
ambient air quality is determined using the  Gaussian Plume model. The source-
receptor-pollutant transfer coefficients are computed from the calculated contributions
of each source to the ambient concentrations at each of the 8 receptors in the airshed.
The model was run to obtain the 24-hourly average ground level concentrations of SPM
for the month of December.  Information on geographic location and configuration of
various discharge points (stack top diameter, stack height) [see annexure 1],
characteristics of SPM laden gas (velocity, temperature and volumetric flow), and rate
of emission from various discharge points is obtained from the BSP.
The costs of SPM abatement for various sources is obtained from the SPM
abatement cost functions.  Engineering cost functions of SPM control are derived from
the plant level data on the financial costs of abatement obtained from the BSP.
6. Results and Discussion
Current total abatement of SPM in BSP from the six sources considered in the
study is 1797.15 tonnes per day (table 2) at an average cost of abatement of Rs. 412 per
ton.  The distribution of total SPM abated by these sources is given in annexure 2.
Marginal costs of SPM abatement vary from as low as Rs. 42.1 per kg to Rs. 2486.4 per
kg of SPM abated.  Of all the sources of SPM considered in the study, the Sinter plant
has the highest and thermal power plant (TPP) has the lowest abatement cost per kg of
SPM.





















Base-case scenario 1849.9 2856.21 - 183.6 -
Present scenario 1797.15 2703.77 - - -
Trading Scenario 1849.9 2721.33 4.72% 170.0 7.4%
* With respect to base-case scenario.
$ 1 lakh is equivalent to 100 thousand.
Compliance with the existing point source emission norms at the sources
considered in the study involves the abatement of 1849.9 tons of SPM per day at a total
abatement cost of Rs. 2856.21 lakh per year (see table 2).  The distribution of total
SPM abated in base-case scenario is given in annexure 3.
Before we discuss the cost implications of the trading scenario it must be
recalled that this study considers only the operating costs of abatement.  Capital cost of
abatement is taken as sunk cost (section 3).  This implies that abatement equipments are
exogenously given.  Abatement efficiency of these equipments is, therefore, a function
of their design efficiency and vintage.  This acts as an additional constraint on the
optimal trading.
For the base–case ambient air quality levels, the cost-effective allocation of
abatement responsibility among various emission sources obtained from the model is
presented in table 3.  The most important observation that can be made on the basis of
these results is that the Sinter plant having the highest abatement cost source is allowed
to emit more (at both the stacks), at 300 mg/Nm
3 against the legislated level of 150
mg/Nm
3.  The other five sources considered in this study would compensate for it by
abating more than their legislated requirements.








TPP 150 100 1
CPP 150 120 1
Kiln 150 75 2
BF 150 135 3
SMS 400 375 1
Sinter 150 300 2
*  TPP has the lowest abatement cost per kg of SPM while Sinter has the highest.
Column 3 of table 2 presents the estimates of cost of SPM abatement for the
base-case and present scenarios as well as the trading scenario.  Lower abatement cost
under the trading scenario reiterates the point that the current regulatory approach is
relatively more expensive.  The cost saving to BSP under the trading scenario works
out to 4.72 per cent of its annual operating costs of air pollution control.  Some may
argue that these savings appear rather small to favour implementation of tradable
permits which are generally associated with significant enforcement costs.  Two things
must be pointed out here.  First, the cost savings reported above are an underestimate
because the trading possibilities are based on the existing clean up devices, the choice
of which are largely governed by the current legislation.  Second, costs of
implementing intra-plant emission trading would be much lower than in the case of
inter-plant emission trading.  Thus taking into account the cost of implementation of
intra-plant trade and the potential savings in capital costs of emission control the net
costs savings under emissions trading would be higher than those reported here.  Thus
our findings support the point that intra-plant emissions trading offers the opportunity
to realise substantial reduction in SPM abatement costs as well as improvement in
ambient air quality (7.4 per cent improvement in air quality at the worst receptor
5) thus
contributing to enhancement of social gains.
                                                       
5  In terms of ambient air quality.xv
7. Policy Implications
Results of this study have demonstrated that emission trading is more cost
effective than the existing regulatory system.  Results show that intra-plant trading
would result in significant savings to the industry, while securing the improvement in
ambient air quality in the studied geographical area.  These point towards the need to
implement intra-plant trading in the identified integrated steel plants in India.
Implementing emission trading would, however, require a reform of the existing
regulatory framework.
8.  Issues for Future Research
The study has identified at least two areas for research follow-up.
¤  Investigating the possibilities of intra-plant trading for other steel plants and other
pollutants.  It may also be worth exploring the cost effectiveness of introducing
inter-plant permit trading.
¤  Examining the issues in compatibility of intra-plant emission trading with existing
laws, legal sanctions, and fines.
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Annexure 1: Sources of emissions, physical characteristics,

















2. Kiln 2 150 ESP 80 2.76
3. SMS 1 400 Venturi Scrubbers 100 4.3
Power plant 2 4.












CPP 1 150 ESP 180 6
5. Blast Furnace 3 150 Cyclone 50 8.2
















1 Sinter plant (exhaust) 22259102.0 28.63 1.94 367.12 2486.4
2 Sinter Plant (discharge) 17800358.0 22.89 1.94 293.58 2486.4
3 Kiln 17046771.2 99.87 1.54 154.42 238.5
4 SMS 25870176.0 87.47 1.83 856.11 1786.7
5 TPP 32719660.8 973.61 1.24 329.62 42.1
6 CPP 30833912.0 527.63 1.38 492.37 128.6
7 Blast Furnace 45937437.7 57.05 1.73 210.54 637.4
Total 1797.15 2703.77xviii






















1 Sinter plant (exhaust) 22259102.0 150 31.56 1.94 443.69 2725.3
2 Sinter Plant (discharge) 17800358.0 150 25.24 1.94 354.82 2725.3
3 Kiln 17046771.2 150 98.55 1.54 151.28 236.8
4 SMS 25870176.0 400 84.72 1.83 807.75 1740.4
5 TPP 32719660.8 150 972.04 1.24 328.96 42.1
6 CPP 30833912.0 150 581.28 1.38 562.67 133.4
7 Blast Furnace 45937437.7 150 56.50 1.73 207.04 632.9
Total 1849.90 2856.21